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CONSTITUTIONAL  DIALOGUE  AND  HUMAN
DIGNITY: STATES AND  TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL  DISCOURSE
Vicki  C. Jackson'
Human  dignity  has  become  an  important  part  of  the
transnational  vocabulary  of  constitutionalism  and  human
rights.  The  Preamble  of the  United Nations Charter expresses
belief in  "the dignity  and  worth  of the  human  person."2   The
Universal Declaration  of Human Rights has been described by a
leading  scholar  as  part  of  the  "large  family  of  dignity-based
rights"  adopted  after  World  War  II.3   Expressed  in  these
foundational  U.N.  documents,  human  dignity  also  plays  an
important role in the jurisprudence  of several nations in Europe,
including Germany.
4
1.  Professor  of  Law,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center.  With  thanks  to  Alida
Dagostino  and Amber  Dolman  for  excellent  research  assistance,  and to  Judith Resnik
and Bob Taylor for helpful comments.
2.  U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
3.  MARY ANN  GLENDON,  A WORLD  MADE NEW  175 (2001);  see Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217(A) (III),  U.N. GAOR,  3d  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  127,  at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4.  See  GRUNDGESETZ  [GG]  art.  1,  §  1  (F.R.G.)  (German  Basic  Law  provision that
human dignity is "inviolable"); see also G.P. Fletcher, Human Dignity As a  Constitutional
Value,  22  U.  W.  ONTARIO  L.  REV.  171 (1984)  ("No  one  would  question  whether  the
protection  of  human  dignity  was  a  primary  task  of  contemporary  legal  culture,"
especially  in  Europe  and North America.);  cf.,  e.g.,  American Declaration  of the Rights
1
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The  U.S.  Constitution  does not refer  specifically  to human
dignity.5   Yet  there  are  some  cognate  concepts  in  the
Constitution's  text,  such  as  the  ban  on  cruel  and  unusual
punishments,  the  protections  of  the  due  process  clause,  and
others that have  been developed  in the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court's
constitutional  jurisprudence. 6  The  phrase  "human  dignity"
(according  to  searches  in  both  Lexis  and  Westlaw)  makes  its
first  appearance  in  the  U.S.  Reports  in  1946,  in  Justice
Murphy's  dissent in In  re Yamashita.7  This post-World  War II
and Duties of Man,  O.A.S.  Official  Rec.,  OEAISer.L.fV/II.82  doc.6  rev.1,  at  17  (1992)
(adopted by  the Ninth  International  Conference  of American  States  (1948))  (beginning
with:  "The American  peoples  have  acknowledged  the  dignity  of  the individual  .... ";
followed  by  Preamble,  beginning:  "All  men  are born  free  and  equal,  in dignity  and  in
rights  .... "), reprinted in BASIC  DOCUMENTS  PERTAINING  TO  HUMAN  RIGHTS  IN  THE
INTER-AMERICAN  SYSTEM,  available  at  http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm;  African
Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples'  Rights,  art.  5,  June  27,  1981,  OAU  Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5,  reprinted in  21  I.L.M.  58 (1981)  (entered into force  Oct.  21,  1986)
("Every individual  shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human
being ... ").
5.  Human  beings  are  referred  to  in the  U.S.  Constitution  as "persons,"  "citizens,"
"residents," "accused," "subjects [of foreign  states]," and "the people"-but not as "human
beings."  The word "dignity" does not appear.
6.  Gerald  L.  Neuman,  Human Dignity in  United  States Constitutional Law,  in
DIETER  SIMONIMANFRED  WEISS  (HRSG.),  ZURE  AUTONOMIE  DES  INDIVIDUUMS,  LIBER
AMICORUM  SPIROS  SIMITIS  249  (NomosVerlagsgesellschaft,  Baden-Baden  2000)
(explanation  of many  areas  of  U.S.  constitutional  law  in  which  the  idea  of  human
dignity, albeit underdeveloped, plays a role).
7.  In  re Yamashita,  327 U.S.  1, 29 (1946)  (Murphy, J., dissenting).  The Court there
upheld the  authority of a  military  commission  to  try and sentence  to death  a defeated
Japanese general for failing to prevent war crime activity by troops under his command.
Justice Murphy,  dissenting, praised the  Court for  rejecting  the government's  argument
that there was no role for judicial review of such proceedings  through habeas corpus, and
dissented on the grounds that the proceedings had been  unfairly conducted and that the
charge  against  General  Yamashita  was  not  one  of  a  war  crime  recognized  by
international law.  In that context, he wrote:
If  we  are  ever  to  develop  an  orderly  international  community  based  upon  a
recognition  of human  dignity it is of the utmost importance that the necessary
punishment  of  those  guilty  of atrocities  be  as  free  as  possible  from  the  ugly
stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.
Id.  at 29.  Justice  Murphy  had  earlier  invoked  "the dignity  of the individual"  in  his
stirring dissent  in Korematsu v.  United States, 323  U.S.  214,  240  (1944)  (Murphy,  J.,
dissenting).  "Human dignity" was  referred  to by Justice  Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion in Adamson v.  California,  332  U.S.  46,  62  (1947)  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring),
and  by  Justice  Murphy  again  in  dissent  on  the  standard  of  review  for  the  denial  of
exemptions  from  selective  service  in  Cox  v.  United States,  332  U.S.  442,  458  (1947)
(Murphy,  J.,  dissenting).  The  first  appearance  of  the  phrase  "human  dignity"  in  a
majority  opinion appears  to have been in Rochin v.  California, 342 U.S.  165,  174 (1952)
(condemning  the use  of "force  so brutal  and  so  offensive  to human  dignity  in  securing
evidence from a suspect" as inconsistent with the Due Process clause).  In dozens  of cases
decided since  1946,  members of the Court have invoked the concept of or used the  words
"human dignity," sometimes in dissent, see, e.g., Poe v.  Ullman, 367 U.S.  497,  555  (1961)
(Harlan, J.,  dissenting)  (referring  to Justice  Jackson's  concerns  to protect  'the  dignity
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appearance  is consistent with the emergence of "human dignity"
as  a  distinctive  feature  of  western  constitutionalism  after  the
war.  Although some members of the U.S.  Supreme  Court in the
postwar period  have  embraced  human  dignity  as  a  motivating
principle  for  the  U.S.  Bill of Rights,8  the role  of the concept  of
"human  dignity"  in  the  Court's  jurisprudence  is  episodic  and
underdeveloped. 9
Expressed  in  such  constitutional  systems  as  Germany's, 1 0
and personality'  of the individual" expressed  in his  separate  concurrence  in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,  546  (1942)),  and often  in connection with Eighth  Amendment
claims, see,  e.g.,  Trop  v.  Dulles,  356 U.S.  86,  100  (1958);  Furman v.  Georgia,  408  U.S.
238,  270,  306  (1972)  (Brennan, J.,  concurring);  Hope  v. Pelzer,  536  U.S.  730,  738,  742
(2002)  (describing cruel treatment  of handcuffing  a prisoner  to a  hitching  post  for long
periods  as  inconsistent  with  his  human  dignity  and  finding  violation  of  Eighth
Amendment), and other criminal procedure  questions, see, e.g.,  Schmerber  v. California,
384 U.S.  757, 770  (1966);  Miranda v. Arizona,  384 U.S. 436, 457  (1966);  Skinner  v.  Ry.
Labor  Executive's  Ass'n,  489  U.S.  602,  644  (1989)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting)  (Fourth
Amendment  issue).  It  has appeared  as well in connection  with free  speech  claims, see,
e.g.,  Philadelphia  Newspapers  Inc.  v.  Hepps,  475  U.S.  767, 781-82  (1986)  (Stevens,  J.,
dissenting),  and, although not referred  to as such in the Court's abortion decisions in the
1970s  and  1980s,  by  the  1990s,  human  dignity  is  invoked  in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  851  (1992)  (plurality  opinion);  id.  at  916,  920  (Stevens,  J.,
concurring  in part and dissenting in part);  id. at  923 (Blackmun,  J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part),  and also  in the "right to die" case,  Cruzan v.  Director,  Missouri
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289  (1990); id. at 311  (Brennan, J., dissenting).  For
an early, detailed analysis of the Court's use of the term "dignity" in connection  with the
rights of individuals, see Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a  Constitutional  Right, 27
HOWARD  L. J.  145,  150-62  (1984).  For further discussion of the concept  of human dignity
in  the Court's  decisions,  see  Neuman,  supra note  6.  For a comparative  analysis  of the
U.S.  Court's concept  of  "dignity," as applied to  individuals  and to government  entities,
see Judith Resnik  & Julie  Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning  the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV.  1921 (2003).
8.  See,  e.g.,  Hugo Adam  Bedau,  The  Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity and the
Death  Penalty, in  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  RIGHTS:  HUMAN  DIGNITY  AND  AMERICAN
VALUES  151 (Michael J.  Meyer & William A. Parent eds., Cornell  1992)  (discussing Chief
Justice  Earl  Warren  and  human  dignity);  Louis  Henkin,  Human  Dignity  and
Constitutional  Rights, in  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF RIGHTS,  supra, at  220-256  (discussing
judicial development of rights related to human dignity).
9.  The concept  of dignity played  an important role in the Court's recent decision  in
Lawrence v.  Texas, 123 S.  Ct. 2472, 2478,  2482 (2003) (holding that state ban on sodomy
violates  Due Process  clause).  A number  of opinions  in the U.S.  Supreme  Court  treat
"human dignity"  as a  concept inherent in the  Eighth Amendment,  as  well as  decisions
respecting individual  autonomy  in decision  making  about  intimate  matters.  See supra
note  7.  Although  U.S.  human  rights law  markedly  diverges  from  that of much  of the
international  community  on  the  death  penalty,  further  study  would  be  needed  to
determine  the  degrees  of  convergence  and divergence  in  its  approach  to  other human
rights  issues.  For  a  very  helpful  discussion  of  convergence  and  divergence  between
international  human  rights  norms  and  domestic  constitutional  norms,  see  Gerald
Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional  Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1863 (2003).
10.  As  Professor Klug pointed out in this journal last year, human dignity also plays
an important  role in the constitutional jurisprudence  of South  Africa,  as  well as  many
3
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human  dignity  is  a  core  component  of  constitutional  juris-
prudence  in  a  constitutional  system  which  also  incorporates
obligations  of  social  solidarity  (and  government  support  of
positive  welfare)  not  found  in  the  U.S.  Constitution.  In
Germany the right to human  dignity is understood  as the  most
basic and foundational of rights, with both negative  and positive
implications  for  how  the  state  should  act.1'  In  the  United
States,  by  contrast,  notions  of affirmative  obligations  to  indi-
viduals on the part of the government have been  rejected, not so
much for lack of textual tools,1 2 but out of a set of constitutional
commitments developed over time.
The U.S.  Supreme  Court  has been  slower than some  other
national courts to become familiar with and discuss, distinguish,
or  borrow  from  related  constitutional  approaches  of  other
nations  and  systems.  The  growth  in  transnational  judicial
discourse, especially  on  constitutional issues relating  to  human
rights,  has  been  remarked  by  many.13  National  courts  in
Argentina,  Botswana,  Canada,  Germany,  India,  South  Africa,
and  elsewhere  not  infrequently  refer  to  the  constitutional
jurisprudence  of  other  nations  in  resolving  domestic  con-
stitutional questions.  Although such references  are not unheard
other tribunals given its significance  in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  and
in the preamble  of major international covenants.  See Heinz Kug, The Dignity Clause of
the Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence  Lead  the  Way  to  an Expanded
Interpretation?,  64 MONT. L. REV.  133 (2003).
11.  See  DONALD  KOMMERS,  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  THE  FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF  GERMANY  299-301,  323-27 (2d ed.  1997);  Fletcher,  supra note  4,  at  178-82
(emphasizing that under German basic law, it is the duty of the state to recognize  and
keep  inviolable  human  dignity);  see  also  EDWARD  J.  EBERLE,  DIGNITY  AND  LIBERTY:
CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS  IN GERMANY AND THE U.S. (Praeger 2002); Klug, supra note 10.
12.  Compare DeShaney  v.  Winnebago  Co.  Dep't  Soc.  Serv.,  489  U.S.  189  (1989)
(holding that government  generally  does not  have  constitutional  obligation  under Due
Process  clause  to  protect  individuals  from  private  violence),  with Robin  West,  Rights,
Capabilities,  and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.  1901,  1911  (2001)  (arguing that
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  should  be  understood  to  commit  government  to  positive
obligation  of  "equal  protection"),  and Susan  Bandes,  The  Negative  Constitution:  A
Critique,  88  MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990).
13.  See  Atkins  v.  Virginia,  536  U.S.  304  (2002),  for  a  recent  set  of  exchanges.
Compare id.  at 316  n.21  (noting  world  community's  disapproval  of  death  penalty  for
mentally  retarded  offenders),  with id. at 322  (Rehnquist, C.J.,  dissenting)  (disagreeing
with  court's  reliance  on  world  community  views),  and  id.  at  347-48  (Scalia,  J.,
dissenting)  (also  disagreeing).  See  also  Vicki  C.  Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and
Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening  Up  the  Conversation on  "Proportionality,"
Rights and Federalism, 1  U.  PA. J.  CONST.  L.  583,  585-86  (1999);  Vicki  C.  Jackson,
Narratives  of Federalism: Of Continuities  and Comparative Constitutional  Experience, 51
DUKE L.J. 223  (2001);  Vicki  C. Jackson,  Gender and Transnational  Legal Discourse, 14
YALE  J.L. & FEMINISM  377 (2002).
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of  in  the  United  States,14  transnational  discourse  involving
national  courts,  supranational  and  international  tribunals  is
still subject  to an internal debate in the United States about its
relevance and propriety. 15
However, international  and national courts are not the only
locations  for the diffusion  and  generation of post World  War II
constitutional  norms;  concomitantly,  federal law is not the only
law  whose  interpretation  might  be  informed  by  comparative
developments.  In  the  United  States,  each  state  has  its  own
constitution,  which  is  the  source  and  site  for  normative
constitutional  development.  Moreover,  state  common  law  and
statutory  law  are  also  within  the  interpretive  province  of the
state  courts.  Given  the  plethora  of  jurisdictions  with  often
comparable  provisions,  many state courts  have  experience  with
the benefits of comparative  law by looking to the interpretations
of  other  state  courts,  albeit  within  the bounds  of the  "nested"
federalism  of  the  United  States,  in  which  all  states  are
constrained  by  the  supremacy  of  federal  law. 16   Thus,
notwithstanding scholarly debate over the possibilities for "bona
fide" state constitutionalism  or for trans-state constitutionalism
in the United  States, 17  many  states have experience  with trans-
14.  See,  e.g.,  Lawrence,  123  S.Ct.  at  2481,  2483;  Atkins,  536  U.S.  at  316  n.21;
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521  U.S.  702,  711  n.8, 718 n.16 (1997);  Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992)  (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
15.  Compare, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21, and Printz v. United States, 521  U.S. 898,
975-78  (1997)  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting),  with Atkins,  536  U.S.  at  347-48  (Scalia,  J.,
dissenting), and Printz,  521  U.S. at 921 n.ll.
16.  See Vicki C. Jackson, Citizenship and Federalism,  in CITIZENSHIP  TODAY: GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES  AND  PRACTICES  127 (T. Alexander  Aleinikoff & Douglas  Klusmeyer  eds.,
Carnegie  2001);  see also Gerald L.  Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization  Policies, 35
VA. J.  INT'L L. 237, 270 (1994).
17.  There are a number of different perspectives  on whether the United States should
be  understood  to  offer  serious  opportunities  for  the  development  of  state-level
constitutionalism  based  on comparative  state  constitutional  discourse.  See,  e.g.,  James
Gardner,  The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,  90 MICH.  L. REV. 761,  831-32
(1992)  (seeking to explain "failure of state constitutionalism" in part because significant
state constitutionalism  is  incompatible  with  national constitutionalism  and  suggesting
that variations  among  state constitutions  are  "clumpy, irregular  variations  of a  single
national  character" arising from bargaining, rather  than commitments  of principle  and
deliberation);  Hans  Linde, E  Pluribus-Constitutional  Theory and State Courts, 18 GA.
L.  REV.  165,  195-96  (1984)  (arguing  that  differences  among  state  constitutions  are
meaningful,  because  those  constitutional  texts  are  "unmistakable  evidence  of  societal
action"  and  are  "important not  for  what  a  court  must  decide  but  for  what  it cannot
plausibly  decide"); James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional  Interpretation,
24  RUTGERS L.J.  985  (1993)  (arguing that  Gardner  is right  only in part and that there
are  some  aspects  of  state  constitutions  that  are  results  of popular  deliberation  and
struggles over high principle,  including direct democracy and free public education);  Paul
Kahn,  Interpretation  and Authority in State Constitutionalism,  106  HARV.  L. REV.  1147
2004
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state  comparative  lawi8  and,  in  some  cases,  with  comparative
state constitutional interpretation. 19  This exper-ience  is helpful,
because  we  are  entering  a  world  in  which  sustaining  the
autonomy  of  one  legal  system  from  another  becomes  more
difficult as decision makers come to know more and as members
of different legal orders increasingly interact with each other.2 0
Montana's  constitutional  history  illustrates  both  the
possibilities  and  the  limitations  of  such  multilayered  trans-
boundary  constitutional  influences.  European  concepts  of
"human dignity" have  evolved  in directions  quite  different from
those in much of the United  States, for reasons  related at least
in part  to  the  interactions  among  newer  and  older legal  ideas
and the varying capacities of existing legal systems to assimilate
newer legal norms to existing traditions.
(1993)  (arguing  that  state  courts  should  be  seen  as  different  interpreters  of
constitutionalism  at the  intersection  of  state  and  federal  authorities  and  that  state
constitutional debate cannot close its eyes to the larger discursive  community in which  it
finds  itself;  also  arguing  against  originalism  in  state  constitutional  interpretation
because  state residents  do not see  themselves as members of a state community reaching
back  to  a  founding  and  arguing  for  engaging  in  interpretation  within  the  larger
interpretive  community  of the  nation);  Daniel  Rodriguez,  State Constitutional Theory
and its Prospects, 28  N.M. L.  REV.  271  (1998)  (calling  for  a  trans-state  constitutional
theory, because  states are not political islands, but units of government  within a diffuse
union of states facing similar problems).
18.  See, e.g., Albinger v.  Harris, 2002 MT 118,  24-28, 310 Mont.  27, IT 24-28, 48 P.
3d  711,  TT  24-28  (2002)  (reviewing  other  state  court  precedents  to  help  determine
appropriate  rule  for resolving disputes  about ownership of engagement  rings);  Bruce  v.
Dyer, 524 A.2d  777, 783-86  (Md. 1987)  (describing in detail the "split of authority" from
other  state court jurisdictions  on whether "agreement  to  sell realty  held in  tenancy by
the entireties  and to  divide  the proceeds  causes  an immediate  conversion  of the estate
into  a  tenancy  in  common");  Miller  v.  State,  732  P.2d  1054,  1063-64  (Wyo.  1987)
(discussing  decisions  of other  states' courts  on intent  to  defraud  element  required  for
criminal conviction  under Wyoming case law).
19.  See,  e.g., Commonwealth  v. Wasson,  842  S.W.2d 487, 498-99  (Ky.  1992)  (holding
state  sodomy  statute  unconstitutional  under  state  guarantees  of  privacy,  found  to  be
broader  than  those  of  U.S.  Constitution,  and  citing  in  support  other  state  court
constitutional  decisions  from  New  York, Pennsylvania,  Michigan  and  Texas);  see also
Commonwealth  v.  Edmunds,  586  A.2d  887,  895  (Pa.  1991)  (setting forth  the "general
rule" that,  in briefing  questions  of Pennsylvania  state  constitutional  law,  the  parties
should analyze four factors, including "related case-law  from other states").
20.  Cf. Hans Linde, Book Review: Materials  on International  Human Rights and U.S.
Criminal Law and Procedure, 85 AM.  J.  INT'L L. 414  (1991)  (noting that U.S. states may
not think to look  to foreign or international sources  of law on criminal procedure issues
out  of belief  that  U.S.  system  is  necessarily  superior,  but  implicitly  suggesting  that
states  might  learn  from  comparison  with  international  and  comparative  materials);
Jackson,  Ambivalent  Resistance,  supra note  13,  at  600-01  (noting  inevitability  of
comparison  and  benefit  of increased  knowledge  on  which  to  ground  more  accurate
comparisons).
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I.  THE MONTANA  HUMAN DIGNITY CLAUSE:  ITS INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE ROOTS
Article II, section 4 of the Montana  Constitution provides:
Individual dignity.  The  dignity  of the  human being is inviolable.
No  person  shall  be  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.
Neither  the state nor any  person, firm,  corporation  or institution
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or
political rights  on account  of race,  color,  sex, culture,  social origin
or condition, or political or religious ideas.
Montana  is  unique  among  the  fifty  U.S.  states  to  so  explicitly
and  generally  protect  human  dignity  in  its  constitutional
document.21  How  that  clause  comes  to  be  in  the  Montana
Constitution  is  a  story  involving  both  a  deliberate  process  of
comparative  study and the impact of a mother's commitment to
equality and human dignity on a son who was a member  of the
Montana Constitutional Convention in 1971.
In  1971,  the  people  of  Montana  voted  to  hold  a
constitutional  convention to propose  a replacement  for the  1889
Constitution.  At least  one impetus for  the convention  was the
failure  of the  1889  Constitution  to include sufficient protections
from  discrimination.22   The  legislature  established  a  Con-
21.  Only  two other state constitutions of which I am aware explicitly refer  to human
or individual dignity.  The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, apparently  inspired in part by
article  II,  section  4 of  the Montana  Constitution  of  1972,  includes  section  3,  "Right to
Individual  Dignity."  See  Mary  Anne  Wolf,  Louisiana's Equal Protection Guarantee:
Questions About the  Supreme Court Decision Prohibiting  Affirmative Action,  58  LA.  L.
REV.  1209,  1223  (1998).  The text  of the provision,  however,  does not repeat the words
used in its title.  It provides in full:
§3 Right to Individual Dignity.
No  person  shall  be  denied  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws.  No  law  shall
discriminate  against  a  person  because  of  race  or  religious  ideas,  beliefs  or
affiliations.  No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably  discriminate
against  a  person  because  of  birth,  age,  sex,  culture,  physical  condition  or
political ideas or affiliations.  Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
LA.  CONST.  art. I, § 3.  In Illinois, article I, section  20 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970,
titled  simply  "Individual  Dignity,"  protects  "individual  dignity"  by  "condemning"
communications  that  incite  violence,  hatred,  abuse  or  hostility  towards  persons  or
groups based on religion, race,  or ethnic  or national affiliation.  The provision  has been
construed  as "purely hortatory," and creating  no private cause  of action nor imposing a
limitation  on the powers of government.  AIDA v.  Time Warner Entm't  Co.,  772 N.E.2d
953, 957, 961 (Ill. 2002);  Irving v. J.  L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ill.  1977).
22.  See Tia  Rikel Robbin,  Untouched Protection from Discrimination:  Private Action
in Montana's Individual  Dignity Clause, 51 MONT. L.  REV. 553, 555 (1990).
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stitutional  Convention  Commission  which, inter  alia,  prepared
several studies, including  one that contained  selected provisions
from  the  bill  of rights  provisions  of other  jurisdictions.  The
delegates,  elected  in  late  1971,  deliberated  and  drafted  the
proposed  constitution  in  the  early  part  of  1972;  the  proposed
constitution was accepted by the voters in June, 1972.23
In the work of the Commission, a deliberate effort was made
to benefit from comparative learning.  Constitutional  Convention
Study Number 10, on the Bill of Rights, is over 300 pages of text
analyzing  federal  and  state  caselaw  and  scholarly  works  on
constitutions  and  constitutionalism  in  the United States.24  Its
forty-page  appendix  of  "Selected  Rights  Provisions"  includes
provisions  from  many  state  constitutions,  designed  to  suggest
"alternative  subjects  and  wording that might be considered  for
inclusion" in the new Montana Constitution.  Included under the
general heading of "Freedom from Discrimination,"  is  article II,
section  1  of the  Puerto  Rico  Constitution,  which  begins  with:
"The  dignity  of  the  human  being  is  inviolable"-language
ultimately borrowed and included in the Montana Constitution.
According  to  two  studies  of  the  dignity  clause  in  the
Montana  Constitution, the language  for this clause  was  indeed
drawn from  the Puerto  Rican constitution's  provisions  included
in this study.25  As Clifford and Huff report, Richard  Champoux,
the delegate  who  introduced  into  the Montana  Convention  the
proposed  text  that  became  article  II,  section  4,  not  only
confirmed  the  Puerto  Rican  source  but  explained  his  own
purposes in introducing the language:
When  asked  about  his intentions  . . . he  spoke  eloquently  about
the influence  of his  mother,  who  strongly  believed that  men  and
women  should  be  treated  equally  and  with  dignity  ....  [H]is
mother's beliefs  reflected, in part, the indignities she had suffered
in the employment markets when she was unable to get a job ....
[He  also expressed]  deep concern  about the degradation of native
peoples in Montana.  . . .26
23.  See Mathew  0.  Clifford & Thomas  P. Huff,  Some  Thoughts on the Meaning and
Scope of the Montana Constitution's  Dignity Clause With Possible Applications, 61 MONT.
L.  REV.  301,  315  (2000)  (citing  Rick  Applegate,  Study  No.  10:  Bill of Rights,  in
MONTANA  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  1971-1972,  at  iii (prepared  by  Mont.  Const'l
Convention  Comm'n);  1  MONTANA  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  TRANSCRIPTS  vi
(1982)).
24.  See  Rick  Applegate,  Study No.  10: Bill of Rights, in MONTANA  CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION  1971-1972  (prepared by Mont.  Const'l Convention Comm'n).
25.  Clifford & Huff, supra note  23,  at 321 n.92 (2000); see also Robbin, supra note 22,
at 555-56.
26.  Clifford  & Huff, supra note  23,  at 321  n.92.  I  am grateful  to the authors of this
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If Montana  was  inspired by  Puerto  Rico  in  1972,  how  did
Puerto  Rico  come  to  have  a  dignity  clause  in  its  constitution?
Adopted  in  1951,  the  Constitution  of  the  Commonwealth  of
Puerto Rico, in article II, section 1, declares:
The  dignity  of the human being  is inviolable.  All  men  are  equal
before  the  law.  No  discrimination  shall  be  made  on  account  of
race,  color,  sex,  birth,  social  origin  or  condition,  or  political  or
religious  ideas.  Both the laws and the system of public education
shall embody these principles  of essential human equality.
This  inviolable  dignity  clause  is  characterized  both  by
constitutional  scholars  and  by  Puerto  Rican  courts  as
fundamental  to  the  entire  structure  of  the  Puerto  Rican
constitution (in ways reminiscent  of the German  constitutional
Court's  treatment  of human  dignity  as  a  basic  norm).  As  one
constitutional scholar explained, the concept of the dignity of the
human  being  is  "the moral  basis  for  democratic  government,"
and  implies  the  "essential  equality"  of  all  people  before  the
law. 27  In other  words,  the inviolable  dignity  of human beings
must  be  reflected  in  both  the  governance  structures  of  a
democracy  and  the  way  in  which  individual  members  are
treated.
The movement in the late 1940s for constitutional change  in
Puerto  Rico  was  the  result  of  a  complex  interaction  between
different  political views and aspirations  for Puerto Rico's status
and relationship to the United States, both in Puerto Rico and in
the  Congress.28  These  developments  were  influenced  by  what
study for having called delegate Champoux  and interviewed  him concerning this history
and for  having  included  this  information  in their  helpful  article.  Robbin  agrees  that
Champoux is  the delegate  who introduced the proposal  ultimately adopted  as article II,
section 4 of the Montana Constitution.  See Robbin, supra note 22, at 560 n.43.
27.  JUAN  M.  GARCIA-PASSALACQUA,  PUERTO  RICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  41  (1974).
Note that Puerto Rico's constitution also has a provision that every person  has the right
to  protection  of  law  against  abusive  attacks  on  his  honor,  reputation  and  private  or
family life.  See P.R. CONST.  art  II, § 8 ("Every  person has the right to the protection of
law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life.").
28.  See JUAN TORRUELLA,  THE SUPREME  COURT AND  PUERTO Rico:  THE DOCTRINE  OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (U. P.R. Press  1985).  In 1950,  Congress authorized Puerto Rico
to adopt, by referendum, a constitution, subject  to certain federal limitations.  See id.  at
146-53.  Delegates to  a constitutional  convention in Puerto  Rico  were  elected  and their
draft approved  by referendum in  1951-52.  See id. at  153.  Under  the 1950 federal  law,
Congress  had reserved  authority to  approve  the constitution  before  it went into  effect,
and Congress  ultimately insisted on the removal of a section guaranteeing  positive social
welfare  rights  and  the  revision  of  another  dealing  with  the  right  to  a  free  public
education,  before  approving  the  constitution.  Id.  at  154-58.  Whether  the  course  of
dealings  leading  to  the  adoption  of the constitution  was  in  the  nature  of  a  compact,
changeable  only by mutual consent of both parties, or had changed  nothing about Puerto
Rico's status insofar as it was  subject to legislative control  by Congress  was a subject of
serious disagreement.  See infra note 30.
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one  author  has  called  an  "international  atmosphere  of  de-
colonization"  and  the  ideas  of  "self-government  and  inde-
pendence that developed during the international  'independence
boom' at the end of the Second World War. 29
In  drafting  the  Commonwealth  Constitution  the  drafters
both used  and expanded  on  the  U.S.  Constitution,  drawing  on
international human rights norms. The  United Nations played  a
key  role,  both  in  inspiring  provisions  based  on  the  Universal
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  as  a  vehicle  for  attempted
resolution  of  the  Commonwealth's  relationship  to  the  United
States. 3 0  As  one  study  says,  "borrowing  from  the  Universal
Declaration  of  Human  Rights"  approved  by  the  United
Nations, 31 the Puerto Rican constitution included rights not then
found in the federal, or in other state, constitutions.32 According
to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico:
[Flormulation of a Bill of Rights following a broader style than the
traditional,  that  would  gather  the  common  feeling  of  different
cultures  on  new  categories  of  rights[,]  was  sought.  Hence  the
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  the  American
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  Duties  exercised  such  an
important influence in the drafting of our Bill of Rights. 33
The  Puerto  Rican  courts  have  emphasized  statements  by
drafters  to the  effect  that the right  to  human  dignity  was  the
29.  ALFREDO MONTALVO-BARBOT,  POLITICAL CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL  CHANGE
IN PUERTO  RiCo,  1898-1952,  at  118  (U. Press  of Am.  1997);  see  also id.  at  125  (noting
assertion by governor  of Puerto Rico's "unique political and economic structure").
30.  See TORRUELLA,  supra note 28,  at 160-65  (describing representations  made to the
U.N.  committee  overseeing  colonial  possessions  that,  by  1953,  the  United  State's
relationship  with  Puerto  Rico  was  that  of  a  compact,  changeable  by  neither  body
unilaterally,  and  thus  Puerto  Rico  was  outside  any  reporting  obligations  respecting
colonies).  However,  both in the  1950s  and since, other statements  from members  of the
government  of the  United  States  have  been  that  Puerto  Rico  remains  subject  to  the
powers  of  Congress,  exercisable  without  Puerto  Rico's  consent.  See,  e.g.,  id. at  169-75
(describing congressional  views  in the  1950s); H.R.  REP.  NO.  104-713, pt.  1, at  10, 21-22
(1996)  (asserting  that  existing  authority  for  self  governance  in  Puerto  Rico  could  be
"rescinded" by  Congress  pursuant  to  Territories  clause  and  referring  to  opinion  from
Justice Department that "mutual consent" clauses  were ineffective  as not binding  later
Congresses);  see  also id.  at  14  (referring  to  "discrepancy"  between  interpretation  of
Puerto Rico status by U.N. in  1953 and "reality" of Puerto Rico's status in United States
federal system).
31.  MONTALVO-BARBOT,  supra note  29,  at  135-36  (noting in particular  the  right  to
work, health, clothing and medical care).
32.  As  noted  above,  provisions  guaranteeing  certain  social  welfare  rights  in  the
Puerto  Rico  constitution  were  controversial  in  Congress  and  were  deleted  or modified
before  approval  of the  Commonwealth  Constitution.  See  id.  at  136-41;  TORRUELLA,
supra note 28, at 154-58.
33.  Arroyo  v.  Rattan  Specialties,  Inc.,  117  P.R.  Dec.  35,  60  (1986)  (quoting  Estado
Libre Asociado v. Hermandad  de Empleados,  104 P.R. Dec. 436, 439-40  (1975)).
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foundational  and most important element of that Bill of Rights,
one from which all others  could  be inferred  even if they had not
been  express.34  The  influences  on  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the
Puerto Rican  constitution,  then, were  themselves  transnational
and  international  in  character,  and  their  influence  was  the
product  of  a  deliberate  effort  to  "gather ...  [from]  different
cultures ...  new categories of rights."
The  Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  adopted  in
1948,  just  three  years  before  the  Puerto  Rican  constitution,
begins with  a whereas  clause referring to the "inherent dignity"
of human beings,  and its first article states:  "All human beings
are born free and  equal in rights and dignity."35  The American
Declaration of the  Rights and Duties of Man, also  adopted  in
1948,  likewise  acknowledges  in its first line  the "dignity of the
individual," and in the first line of its preamble  states:  "All men
are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights."36
Puerto  Rico's  incorporation  of  language  and  ideas  from
these international human rights documents  was part of a wave
of post World  War  II constitution  making.  Puerto  Rico's  1951
Constitution  parallels  the  German  Basic  Law  of  1949  in  two
interesting  respects  (though  I  am  unaware  of  any  direct
influence  of  the  German  constitution  on  Puerto  Rico's
constitution).  The  German  Basic  Law,  adopted  in  1949  under
Allied  supervision, begins  with article  I, section  1:  "The dignity
of man is inviolable.  To respect  and protect it  shall be the duty
of  all  public  authority."  According  to  Donald  Kommers,  a
leading U.S. scholar of the German constitution:
[The human  dignity clause  is]  of primary importance  ....  In  the
view of the Federal Constitutional Court, this clause expresses the
highest value of the Basic Law, informing  the substance and spirit
of  the  entire  document.  While  encompassing  all  guaranteed
rights,  the  concept  of human  dignity  also  includes  a  morality  of
34.  See, e.g.,  Arroyo,  117  P.R.  Dec.  at  69-72  (discussing  statements  made  by  the
Convention  on the Bill of Rights regarding  the purpose of the dignity clause found  in 4
DIARIO  DE  SESIONES  DE  LA  CONVENCION  CONSTITUTYENTE  2561,  and  2  DIARIO  DE
SESIONES  DE  LA  CONVENCION  CONSTITUYENTE  1372);  Figueroa  Ferrer  v.
Commonwealth,  107  P.R. Dec.  278, 281-87 (1978)  (discussing the meaning of the dignity
clause as a constitutional right and its relationship  to the right of privacy established in
article II, section 8 of the Puerto Rican constitution).
35.  See  GLENDON,  supra note  3, at 174 (describing views of a principal  drafter, Ren6
Cassin,  that the general  principles  of "dignity, liberty,  equality and brotherhood"  were
the  foundations  for  the  rest  of  the  Declaration);  cf.  id. at  146  (describing  Eleanor
Roosevelt's  defense  of  the  dignity  clause  in  the  Universal  Declaration  as  meant  to
explain why human beings have rights to begin with).
36.  See American Declaration  of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 4.
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duty that may limit the exercise of a fundamental right.
3
Like Puerto Rico's constitution, the German  Basic Law prohibits
the  death  penalty,  a  provision  not  found  in  either  of  the
international instruments  discussed  above.3 8  Whatever  specific
transnational  influences  may  have  been  at  work,  both  Puerto
Rico  and  Germany  were  part  of  a  wider  constitution-making
phenomenon  reflecting  increased  legal  commitments  to  human
rights.
So, to summarize:  Montana's "human dignity" clause reveals
connections  to  a  history  of  international  and  foreign
constitution-making  and human rights declarations  in the years
following  the  end  of  World  War  II,  at  a  time  when  the
international  community  was  converging  on  the  centrality  of
human dignity as a fundamental value.39  Puerto Rico, in its own
struggle  for  greater  degrees  of  autonomy  and  independence,
deliberately  seeks  to  incorporate  multiple  constitutional  tra-
ditions  and borrows  language  and  ideas  for  its  human  dignity
clause  from  the  Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights  and
other  transnational  sources.  Given  the  importance  of
international  supervision  to  emerging  colonies,  it was  perhaps
especially  understandable  that Puerto  Rico  should  have  looked
in  this  direction  for  influence.  But  what  is  perhaps  less
predictable  is  that  twenty  years  later,  the  state  of Montana
would  in  turn  look  to  Puerto  Rico,  not  necessarily  in  a  self-
conscious  effort  to  draw on different  constitutional cultures  but
simply to improve  its own constitution.  From the  defeat  of the
Nazis,  to  international  declarations  of the  centrality  of human
dignity,  to  a  constitutionally  anomalous  territory  becoming  a
commonwealth  of  the  United  States,  to the  State  of Montana,
37.  KOMMERS,  supra note  11,  at 298.  For an insightful  discussion of the pre-World
War II roots  of German and  French commitments  to the protection of personal  dignity,
rooted in  respect  for  honor,  see James Whitman,  Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three
Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000).
38.  See  P.R.  CONST.  art. II,  §  7  (stating that  the  "death  penalty  shall  not  exist);
GRUNDGESETZ  [GG]  art.  102  (F.R.G.)  (German  Basic  Law  provision  that  "capital
punishment  is  abolished").  The  German  Basic  Law  also  includes  the  idea  of  state
responsibility  for  social  welfare,  an  idea  embodied  as well  in  the version  of a proposed
constitution  drafted  by the Puerto  Rican  Constitutional  Convention  and  approved in  a
popular referendum.  As  noted above, some of the social welfare provisions in the Puerto
Rican  constitution  were  stricken  by  Congress  before  it  would  approve  the  proposed
constitution in 1951.  See supra note 28.
39.  In the Japanese  constitution, the  word dignity appears  in article 24,  dealing with
equality  of the sexes  with respect to matrimonial  and family  matters.  See KENPO,  art.
24.  This  constitution  was  drafted,  essentially  by  the  Allied  Command,  in  1946-two
years before the Universal Declaration  of Human Rights was adopted.
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the idea  of a constitutional right to human dignity has traveled
through a set of international and intra-national boundaries.
II.  HUMAN DIGNITY AS TRANSPLANT:  DOMESTICATION  OR
INVIGORATION?
In the Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights,  the idea of
human dignity was a unifying basic concept that related both to
the  guarantees  of  "negative"  civil  rights  and  liberties 4 0  and
''positive"  concepts  of  human  rights  to  minimally  adequate
necessities  of  life.41   The  dignity  clause  in  the  Montana
Constitution,  coupled  with  the  extension  of  the  ban  on
discrimination  to  private  persons  as  well  as  the  government,
might  have  foreshadowed  judicial  development  of  a  juris-
prudence  closer  to  those  of nations,  like  Germany,  under  the
influence of domestic constitutional social  welfare commitments.
But  for the most part, the  dignity  clause  in Montana  has been
treated  as reinforcing  values,  such as  protection  from  unlawful
searches  and seizures,  government  discrimination,  and privacy,
more specifically identified elsewhere.  The migration of the idea
of human dignity  illustrates not only  the diffusion  of ideas  but
also  the  interaction  between  new  ideas  and other  elements  of
the  system  in  which  they  are  embraced.  The  impact  of
constitutional text may vary substantially depending on context,
development,  history and culture.  New texts may be as readily
domesticated  within  existing paradigms  as they may transform
those  paradigms. 42  A  brief  discussion  of human  dignity  and
constitutional  law  in  Montana  and  Puerto  Rico  will  illustrate
40.  See,  e.g.,  UNIVERSAL  DECLARATION,  supra note  3,  arts.  9-11  (protection  from
arbitrary arrest or punishment without trial in which presumption of innocence obtains).
41.  See, e.g.,  id. arts. 22-26  (right to  social security,  right to work  in just conditions,
right to education).
42.  Professor  Klug  has suggested  that Montana  "mine foreign  dignity jurisprudence
in  its  efforts  to  define  the  content  and  scope  of its  own  clause,"  despite  "inherent
limitations" based on "particular legal forms inherent to [other]  countries' legal  systems."
Klug,  supra note  10,  at  155.  Although  I  share  Professor  Klug's  enthusiasm  for
increasing judicial  awareness of constitutional  development in other countries of cognate
legal ideas  and values,  the  term "mining" connotes  a  more  direct  kind  of utilization  of
external  sources  of law.  Even  where  the same  words  are  used to  refer  to  concepts  or
rights with universal  qualities,  both institutional  and historic  differences  may  mediate
and complicate  the  directness  of appropriate  influence  or consideration.  See  Neuman,
supra note 9, at 1890.
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this phenomenon.
Notwithstanding  the presence  of the human  dignity clause
in the  Montana  Constitution  for  now  over  thirty years,  it  has
played  a  secondary  and  at  best  complementary  role  in  the
Montana  cases  in which it  has appeared.43  Far more important
has been the next sentence of article II, section  4, securing equal
protection.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  find  courts  employing
extended  analysis  of  the  equal  protection  component  of  the
constitutional  provision, 44  with  perhaps  a  short  rhetorical
reference  to  dignity.  Notwithstanding  the  constitutional  text
extending  the anti-discrimination  principle  to  action by  private
entities, there are a number of Montana cases that appear to say
that  the equal  protection  clause  has the  same  meaning  as  the
federal  equal  protection  provision  (which  applies  only  in  the
presence  of  state  action).45   The  analogy  to  the  federal
43.  For discussion of this underutilization,  see, for example,  Robbin, supra note 22,  at
553-54,  562-63,  Clifford  & Huff, supra note  23,  at  302-303,  and  Mark  S.  Kende,  The
Issues of E-Mail Privacy and Cyberspace Personal Jurisdiction: What  Clients Need  to
Know About Two Practical  Constitutional  Questions Regarding  the Internet, 63 MONT.  L.
REV.  301, 315-16 (2002).
44.  For cases decided  under Montana's  "individual dignity" clause that focus  analysis
on  equal  protection,  see,  for  example,  State v.  Taylor, 168  Mont.  142,  542  P.2d  100
(1975),  which  rejected an equal protection challenge to a method of jury selection, Oberg
v.  City  of Billings, 207  Mont.  277,  674  P.2d  494  (1983),  finding  unconstitutional  an
exception  as  to  law  enforcement  workers  from  a  state  statute  that  generally  barred
employers'  use of polygraphs,  Cottrill v.  Cottrill Sodding Serv.,  229 Mont.  40,  744 P.2d
895  (1987),  holding  unconstitutional  a  workers'  compensation  statute's  exclusion  of
members  of the employer's  family, and  Stratemeyer v.  Lincoln Co.,  259  Mont.  147,  855
P.2d  506  (1993),  rejecting  a challenge  to an  exclusion  for  recovery  for mental  stress  in
workers' compensation  law.
45.  See Emery v. State, 177 Mont. 73, 79,  580 P.2d 445, 449 (1978) (stating that "(t]he
similar  provisions  of the equal protection  clause  of the United  States  Constitution and
the  equal  protection  clause  of  the  1972  Montana  Constitution  provide  generally
equivalent but independent  protection in their respective jurisdictions"); see also Godfrey
v. State  Fish &  Game  Comm'n,  193 Mont. 304,  306,  631 P.2d  1265,  1267  (1981)  (noting
that both the Montana  Constitution, article II,  section 4,  and the equal protection clause
of the U.S. Constitution have the same purpose,  to "ensure that persons who are citizens
of this  country are not the subject of arbitrary  and discriminate  [sic]  state action").  As
noted, the analogy  is particularly surprising  in light of the apparently  clear text  of the
equal  protection part of the Montana  clause  to  extend to  private  discrimination,  when
the federal  equal  protection  clause  does  not.  See  Robbin,  supra note  22,  at  553,  556
(describing  different  understandings  of  this  clause  in  the  Convention,  noting  that its
prohibition  of  discrimination  by  private  parties  "has remained  dormant," and  urging
more  use  of  its  express  language  to  protect  people  from  private  as  well  as  public
discrimination).  But, for more  recent apparent judicial  recognition that the clause does
apply  to private  discrimination,  see  Harrison  v.  Chance, 244 Mont. 215,  225,  797  P.2d
200, 206 (1990),  asserting, in a sexual harassment claim against a private  employer, that
"[f]reedom  from sexual discrimination  is a constitutional  right in Montana under Article
II,  Section  4," but concluding  that the plaintiffs  exclusive  remedy  was that provided  in
14
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Constitution may have overwhelmed  the potential for developing
independent  lines  of analysis  that  are latent in  the  individual
dignity clause.
46
Yet,  justices  on  the  Montana  Supreme  Court  have  also
asserted  on occasion  that the  state  constitution provides  rights
that are  different  from  and, in  some  respects,  more  expansive
than  those  in  the  federal  Constitution;4 7  in  some  cases,  the
dignity clause may have played some role.
In  Oberg v.  City of Billings, 48  a  police  officer  challenged  a
requirement  that he submit to a polygraph, and argued that an
exemption  in a state  law  generally  prohibiting employer's  uses
of  polygraphs  for  law  enforcement  employees  was  uncon-
stitutional.  The  court  agreed,  finding  the  exception  uncon-
state  statute,  and Drinkwalter v.  Shipton Supply  Co.,  225  Mont.  380,  732  P.2d  1335
(1987),  holding  that the  legislature  had  not  indicated  a  clear  intent  to  abolish  other
common  law remedies  and that, in light of the  constitution's  protection against  gender
discrimination,  plaintiff  was  not  limited  to  a  statutory  Human  Rights  Commission
remedy for sexual harassment.  Drinkwalter,  as was noted in Harrison,  was legislatively
overruled  within  months  of  being  decided;  Harrison upheld  the  limitation  of  such
plaintiffs to the statutory Human Rights  Commission  remedy.  In a very recent dissent,
Chief Justice  Karla  M. Gray has argued  that discussion  by the delegates  to Montana's
Constitutional  Convention  shows  that  the  "dignity"  clause  of  article  II,  section  4
captured  an intent to "eradicat[e]  public and private  discrimination based on race, color,
sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas," and that the section
had  "no  intent"  to  accomplish  anything  other  than  removal  of  certain  types  of
discrimination.  Walker v.  State,  2003 MT  134,  9  98-99,  316 Mont.  103,  98-99,  68
P.2d  872,  IT  98-99  (Gray,  C.J.,  dissenting)  (quoting  two  different  delegates).  She
concluded  that "[n]othing  in  the transcripts  supports  a  free-standing,  separate  dignity
right."  Id.  99.  Chief Justice  Gray's emphasis  in her opinion  was on the  absence  of a
separate  right  to  human  dignity, and  not  on whether  the section  extended  to  private
discrimination,  though the passage  quoted  above contemplates  that  it  does reach  such
private discrimination.
46.  See  also Ronald  K.  L.  Collins,  Reliance on  State Constitutions-The Montana
Disaster,  63  TEX.  L.  REV.  1095  (1985)  (describing Montana  Supreme  Court's  failure  to
adhere  to  state  grounds  of  decision  with  respect  to  unlawful  search  and  seizure  on
Supreme Court remand of issue).
47.  See,  e.g., Dorwart  v.  Caraway,  2002  MT 240,  312 Mont.  1, 58  P.2d  128  (holding
that cause  of action  for  monetary  relief is  implied from  provision  of state constitution
protecting privacy, relying on state constitution  and statutory law and considering cases
from many other states).  Justice Nelson, concurring,  emphasized that:
[l]ndependent of  any federal  jurisprudence,  federal  constitutional  authority,
the common law, or other authority, the foundation for private causes of action
for damages for constitutional violations is found in the language of Montana's
1972 Constitution...  it is important to acknowledge this principle, because the
greater  guarantees  of individual  rights  afforded  by  Montana's  Constitution
may  be  neither bounded  nor  frustrated by federal court  decisions which, with
seeming increasing frequency,  are weakening similar protections  of the federal
Constitution.
Id.  84.
48.  207 Mont. 277, 674 P.2d 494 (1983).
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stitutional under "rational basis" equal protection  scrutiny.49  In
dicta,  the court indicated,  that had there been further evidence
that the  exception  was  intended  by the  legislature  to apply  to
law enforcement  officers  because  of their  office  of public  trust,
the  exception  would  have  passed  rational  basis  scrutiny,  but
would  still have  been vulnerable  under  strict scrutiny  because,
under article II, section 4, "subjecting one to a lie detector test is
an affront to one's dignity."50
In  Gryczan  v.  State,51  the  court  held  unconstitutional  a
statute criminalizing  gay sex between  adults.  The court rested
on violations of the right to privacy, without resolving challenges
that the  statute  infringed  the right to  dignity  and the right  to
equal  protection  of the law.52  And in Armstrong v. State,53 the
court noted the dignity clause  as well  as the state constitution's
privacy  clause  in  support  of  its  conclusion  that  a  statute
prohibiting  certified  physician  assistants  from  performing
abortions  violated  the  right  to  privacy  protected  by  article  II,
section 10 of the Montana  Constitution.
In an interesting discussion, Armstrong appears to attribute
both  some  independent  value  to  the  "dignity"  clause  and  a
coherent  connectedness  between  the right to  dignity  and  other
rights secured in the state constitution:
Respect  for  the dignity  of each  individual-a  fundamental  right,
protected  by  Article  II  Section  4  of  the  Montana  Constitution-
demands  that  people  have  for  themselves  the  moral  right  and
moral  responsibility  to confront  the  most fundamental  questions
about the  meaning and value  of their  own  lives and the intrinsic
value  of life  in  general,  answering  to  their own  consciences  and
convictions.  Equal  protection...  requires  that  people  have  an
equal  right  to  form  and to  follow  their own  values  in  profoundly
spiritual  matters  .... Finally the right of individual privacy  ...
requires  the  government  to  leave  us  alone  in  all  these  most
personal and private  matters.54
Armstrong raised  the  possibility  that the  Montana  court  was
poised  to  articulate  a  distinctive  vision  of  what  respect  for
individual human  dignity means  by building on this  passage.5 5
49.  See Oberg, 207 Mont. at 281,  674 P.2d at 496.
50.  Oberg, 207 Mont. at 285, 674 P.2d at 498.
51.  283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
52.  See Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 451,  942 P.2d at 123.
53.  1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361,  989 P.2d 364.
54.  Id.  72.
55.  For possible evidence  of this, see Associated Press, Inc. v.  Mont. Dep't of Revenue,
2000  MT  160,  58,  300  Mont.  233,  58,  4  P.3d  5,  58,  in  which  Justice  Nelson,
specially  concurring, relied on the individual dignity clause  to conclude that the right to
Vol. 65
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Yet in Armstrong, the court's emphasis  on the  dignity clause  as
respecting  people's  rights  to  make  their  own  decisions  about
fundamental  questions appears virtually identical  to the right  of
personal  decision  making,  articulated  as  a  matter  of federal
constitutional  law  in  Casey, notwithstanding  the  absence  of a
human dignity clause in the U.S. Constitution.5 6
Although this might suggest that the human dignity clause
should  be  understood  simply  as  a  new  phrase  permitting
elaboration  of analyses already reasonably well developed under
other  clauses  in  U.S.  constitutional  culture,  two  later  cases
suggest that a more expansive  use of the human dignity clause
in Montana may have arrived.  In Albinger v. Harris, 57 the court
held,  in  an  issue  of  first  impression  in  Montana,  that  an
engagement  ring  was  an  irrevocable  gift,  rejecting  the  view  of
many other  states that it  was  conditional  on marriage.  In the
opinion for the court, Justice Nelson (who has also sought to give
substance  to the  "dignity" idea  in  his  opinions  in Gryczan and
Associated Press) relied  on  the  individual  dignity  clause  as
committing  the  state  to  oppose  gender  bias.  The  court
concluded  that,  in  the  context  of  the  abolition  of  actions  for
breach  of  a  promise  to  marry  (including  denial  of actions  to
recover money spent-in the court's  view, typically by women-
on  wedding  preparations),  treating  engagement  rings  as
conditional  gifts  would reinforce  gender  unfairness.  The  court
wrote:
Article  II,  Section  4  of the Montana  Constitution  recognizes  and
guarantees  the  individual  dignity  of each  human  being  without
regard  to  gender  ....  While  not explicitly  denying  access  to  the
courts  on the basis of gender, the 'anti-heart balm'  statutes closed
courtrooms  across the nation to female plaintiffs seeking damages
for  antenuptial  pregnancy,  ruined  reputation,  lost  love  and
economic  insecurity  . . . . Conditional  gift  theory  applied  ex-
clusively  to  engagement  ring  cases  carves  an  exception  in  the
state's gift law for the benefit of predominantly male plaintiffs ....
[T]he statutory 'anti-heart balm' bar continues to have a disparate
impact on women.  If this Court were to fashion a special exception
for  engagement  ring  actions  under  gift  law  theories,  we  would
privacy protected by the Montana Constitution is that of individuals,  not corporations.
56.  See  Planned  Parenthood  v.  Casey,  505  U.S.  833,  851  (1992)  (Joint Opinion  of
Justices  Kennedy,  O'Connor  and Souter)  ("These  matters, involving  the  most intimate
and personal choices a person  may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal  dignity
and autonomy,  are  central to  the liberty  protected by the  Fourteenth Amendment.  At
the heart  of liberty is  the right  to define  one's own  concept  of existence,  of meaning,  of
the  universe, and of the  mystery of human  life.  Beliefs  about these  matters could  not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed  under compulsion of the State.").
57.  2002 MT 118, 310 Mont. 27, 48 P.3d  711.
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perpetuate  the  gender  bias  attendant  upon  the  Legislature's
decision  to  remove  from  our  courts  all  actions  for  breach  of
antenuptial promises.
5 8
Although  the court  relied  specifically  on  the  individual  dignity
clause, given its reasoning  it might well  also have  relied on the
commitment  to  equality  and  antidiscrimination  found  in  the
same section.
Most  recently  in  Walker  v.  State,59  the  Montana  Supreme
Court, again in an opinion by Justice Nelson, concluded that the
Montana  Constitution's  human  dignity  provision  established
more  demanding  standards for  the treatment  of prisoners than
those  under  the  Eighth  Amendment  of the  U.S.  Constitution.
Although  Montana's  constitution  has  a  cruel  and  unusual
punishment  clause,  the court  indicated that in some  cases that
clause must be interpreted together  with the individual dignity
clause  to  require that, "'whatever means we  use  to  reform,  we
must not punish or reform in a way that degrades the humanity,
the  dignity  of the  prisoner.' 6 0   The  court  is  explicit  in stating
that the human  dignity  clause,  together  with article  II,  section
22  of  the  Montana  Constitution  "provide  Montana  citizens
greater  protections  from  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  than
does  the  federal  Constitution."61   Although  the  language  of
article  II, section  22 of the Montana  Constitution tracks  that of
the federal clause,62 the court indicated that in  some  cases, the
right  of individual  dignity  will be implicated  together  with the
cruel and unusual punishment clause and found such a violation
there.63  A strongly  worded  dissent  disagreed  with  the effort  to
ground  a heightened  standard  for the treatment of prisoners  in
58.  Id.  35-37.  The  court's opinion  elicited  a  strongly  worded dissent  by  Justice
Trieweiler.  See id.  75  (Trieweiler, J.,  dissenting) (noting that the  dignity clause  and
gender  bias arguments  had not been  raised by the parties  and  arguing that the court's
opinion  itself was based on  gender  stereotypes  about  who  tends to jilt  whom  and who
gives whom  engagement rings and perpetuated  gender bias).  But see Rebecca  Tushnet,
Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE  L.J.  2583 (1998)  (arguing that "the shift  to  mandatory
ring return rules and the denial of women's claims for restitution have combined to make
premarital law unfavorable  to women," a regime that is "both unequal  and unjustified").
59.  2003  MT 134, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872.
60.  Id.  81 (quoting Clifford  & Huff, supra note 23, at 331-32).
61.  Id.  73.
62.  Compare MONT.  CONST.  art.  II,  §  22  ("Excessive  sanctions"  clause,  providing:
"Excessive  bail shall  not be required,  or excessive  fines  imposed,  or cruel  and unusual
punishments  inflicted."),  with  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  VIII  ("Excessive  bail  shall  not  be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
63.  The  court  found  a  violation  where  degrading  living  conditions  (including very
unhygienic conditions) exacerbated a prisoner's mental illness.  Walker,  82-84.
Vol. 65
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the  dignity  clause,  asserting  that  the  only  purpose  of  the
constitutional  section in which the dignity clause is found was to
establish an antidiscrimination principle.64
In contrast to the generally  subordinate or, in recent years,
controversial  use of the human dignity clause  in Montana,  in  a
number  of  cases  the  Puerto  Rican  Supreme  Court  framed  its
analyses  around  the  concept  of  human  dignity,  asserting  that
the inviolability of human dignity is the foundational concept  at
the  base  of  the  Commonwealth's  commitments  both  to
democracy  and to human rights.6 5  Thus, in one case, the court
quotes  from  the  proceedings  of  the  constitutional  convention
where  the  president  of the  Committee  on  the  Bill  of Rights,
Jaime  Benitez,  explained  the  function  of  the  human  dignity
clause:
It  is  the  affirmation  of  the  moral  principle  of  democracy;  the
principle  that  the  human  being  and  his  dignity  constitute  the
raison d'etre  and justification  of political  organization  ....  [W]e
believe that  the  expression, in  its sober  declaration,  encompasses
the totality of the principles that shall later on develop and delimit
themselves as required in each case.
66
In  developing  its  human  dignity  clause  jurisprudence,  the
Puerto  Rico  court  borrows  from  U.S.  constitutional  law  on
privacy  (thus revealing similar  convergences  to those  described
in  Montana),67  and  also  invokes  scholarly  work  on  human
dignity,6 8  and the experience  in other jurisdictions  with  similar
64.  Walker,  98-101 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
65.  See Arroyo v. Rattan  Specialities, Inc.,  117 P.R. Dec.  35, 60,  69-70  (1986) (quoting
from  the record  of the  constitutional  convention);  Garcia  Santiago  v. Acosta,  104  P.R.
Dec.  448,  453  (1975)  (discussing  degree  to  which  state  interference  in  family  life  is
consistent  with provision that dignity of human being  is inviolable);  Figueroa Ferrer v.
Commonwealth,  107  P.R.  Dec.  250,  278,  282-87  (1978)  (holding  that requirement  for
fault to obtain a divorce violated Puerto Rico's constitution, through discussion of dignity
clause  and privacy clause, and arguing that the inviolability  of human dignity requires
that  interferences  with private  life  be  limited  only  to compelling  circumstances).  The
cases  often  associate  human dignity with  the right of privacy  and  honor found  later in
the  Puerto  Rican constitution.  For scholarly  discussion, see  Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan,
Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality  Rights in the Constitutional  Jurisprudence of
Germany, the United States and the  Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
343,  366-70 (1998),  describing the depth of the framers' commitments to the "principle of
human  dignity",  and  Garcia-Passalacqua,  supra note  27,  at  40-41,  discussing human
dignity as the moral  basis for democratic  government  because the human being  and his
dignity constitute the reason for and justification of  political organization.
66.  Arroyo,  117  P.R.  Dec.  at  70  (quoting  2  DIARIO  DE  SESIONES  DE  LA  CONVENCI6N
CONSTITUYENTE  1372 (1951)).
67.  See Figueroa  Ferrer,  107 P.R. Dec. at 284-86.
68.  See id. at 286  (referring, inter alia, to writings of Maaritan,  Rommen, Friedman,
Machan, McDougal,  Lasswell, and Tribe).
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issues,69   including  in  at  least  one  instance  a  German
constitutional court decision. 70
The emphasis  on human dignity comes through in a number
of  decisions  under  the  Puerto  Rico  constitution.  The  1978
decision  in  Figueroa-Ferrer,  holding  that  human  dignity  and
privacy  required  no-fault  divorce,  found  unconstitutional  a
divorce  statute that permitted divorce  only for  cause; the court
criticized  a fault  regime in divorce  as one that requires  married
couples  either  to  mislead  the  court or  to  surrender  aspects  of
their  private  lives  to  public  scrutiny.71  Moreover,  the  court
noted  the  current  reality  was  one  in  which  couples  in  fact
procured  divorces  on  mutual consent,  albeit through  a judicial
charade.  The  constitutional  principles  of  dignity  and  privacy
"are  based  on  principles  which  aspire  to  universality,"  and
"protect ...  dignity  and  private  life  in  divorce  proceedings
through  the  expression  of  the  mutual  decision  to  obtain  a
divorce."72
69.  Id.  at  287-95 (surveying  divorce  laws  in many  state jurisdictions  in  the United
States and  in the countries of Latin America and Europe).
70.  See  Arroyo,  117  P.R.  Dec.  at  50  n.15  (citing  a  German  case  on  polygraphy,
Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof  (I.  Strafsenat), Feb.  16,  1954,  5  Entscheidungen  des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 332).
71.  Figueroa Ferrer, 107  P.R.  Dec.  at  301.  In  other  parts  of the  United  States it
appears  that the  move to "no-fault" divorce  was led by legislatures, and that the issues
brought  before  courts  challenged  the  constitutionality  of abandonment  of fault-based
grounds for  divorce.  See, e.g.,  In  re Walton, 28  Cal. App.  3d  108  (1972); Joy v.  Joy,  423
A.2d  895 (Conn.  1979);  Ryan  v.  Ryan,  277  So.  2d  266 (Fla.  1973).  For at  least  a hint
that some members  of the U.S. Supreme  Court  would have regarded  with skepticism  a
claim  that the  federal  Constitution  prohibited  states  from  maintaining  a  fault-based
system  for  divorce,  see  United States  v.  Kras, 409  U.S.  434,  462  (1973)  (Marshall,  J.,
dissenting).  Disagreeing  with the  Court's  decision upholding  fees for indigent filings  in
bankruptcy,  Justice  Marshall  argued  that given  the  decision in  Boddie  v.  Connecticut,
401  U.S.  371  (1971),  striking down  filing fees  for  divorce  as  applied to  indigents,  the
same  logic  should have  invalidated the bankruptcy  filing  fee.  The  Court had sought  to
distinguish  bankruptcy  from  divorce  because  the  granting  of  divorces  impinges  on
"associational  interests."  Kras,  409  U.S.  at  444-45.  Justice  Marshall's  dissent
commented on this "suggestion":
Are we to require that state divorce  laws serve compelling state interests?  For
example,  if a State  chooses to allow  divorces  only when  one party is shown  to
have  committed  adultery,  must  its  refusal  to  allow  them  when  the  parties
claim irreconcilable differences  be justified by some compelling state interest?
Id.  at 462 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Marshall went on to explain that his questions
were  intended,  "only to suggest that the  majority's  focus  on the relative  importance  in
the  constitutional  scheme  of  divorce  and  bankruptcy  is  misplaced,"  because  the
important issue was "access to the courts," id.;  yet his questions hint  at the difficulty a
federal constitutional challenge to divorce laws might have faced.
72.  Figueroa  Ferrer, 107 P.R. Dec. at 301.  Between 1969 and  1991, virtually all of the
states and D.C. had  by statute provided for  some form  of no-fault  divorce.  See Lynn  D.
Wardle,  No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991  B.Y.U.  L. REV.  79,  83-91
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In  1986,  the  Puerto  Rico  court  in  Arroyo  held  uncon-
stitutional  a  private  employer's  use  of  a  polygraph.  Human
dignity played  a central  role in  the opinion,  which  emphasized
the need to respond to technological  advances while protecting
the  most  precious  thing  in  the  lives  of all  human  beings  in  a
democratic  society:  dignity,  integrity  and  privacy.  Our
Constitution is the safekeeper  of these values.  Therefore, we  must
refer  to its provisions  and set them up  as the main  protectors  of
these  ethico-moral  values  which  are  consubstantial  with  human
nature and essential to community life in a democratic society.73
The  court  went  on  to  assert  that  the  right  to  control  the
disclosure  of  one's  own  thoughts  was  protected  by  the
constitution,  as  against  intrusions  by  the  state  and  private
citizens.
74
This  opinion has a distinctive  feel  to it,  as compared to the
Montana  court's  opinion  in  Oberg  (also  dealing  with
polygraphy),  both in  the  form and breadth  of argument  from  a
variety  of  comparative  sources  and  in the  Puerto  Rico  court's
confident  assertion  that  the  constitution  constrained  private
citizens in their dealings with others.75  Interestingly, the Puerto
Rico  court  cites both  to the  German  Basic  Law  provision that,
"the dignity of the human being is inviolable," and to a German
decision  prohibiting use of polygraphs  in a criminal case, not  on
grounds  of  their  unreliability,  but  rather  because  use  of
polygraph  tests, "violated the individual's  freedom  to make  his
own decisions  and act according  to his  will."76  While some  U.S.
state jurisdictions  reached  similar results  as  a  matter  of state
tort law, constraining  employers from using polygraphs  on their
employees, 77  others  did  not;78  and  both  state  and  federal
(1991)  (all states but Arkansas);  see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(5) (2003).
73.  Arroyo, 117 P.R. Dec. at 56-57 (citations omitted).
74.  See id. at 72 ("Regardless  of the degree of reliability that the polygraph test could
reach, its intrusion upon the mind of the human being, with  his thoughts, is such that he
loses the  freedom  to control  the disclosure  of his  own  thoughts ....  Our Constitution
guarantees that a  part of ourselves  may  be free  from  the intrusion  of the State  and  of
private citizens.").
75.  Although the Montana dignity clause's equal protection provision  explicitly refers
to private entities, this aspect of the clause for a long time lay "dormant," to use Robbin's
word.  Robbin, supra  note 22, at 553;  see supra note 45.
76.  Arroyo,  117  P.R.  Dec.  at  59  n.15  (citing  Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof  (I.
Stra/senat), Feb.  16,  1954,  5  Entscheidungen  des  Bundesgerichtshofes  in  Strafsachen
332).
77.  See,  e.g.,  Cordle  v.  Gen.  Hugh  Mercer  Corp.,  325  S.E.2d  111  (W.  Va.  1984)
(holding  that  it  violated  West  Virginia's  public  policy  to  require  an  employee  to  be
polygraph tested, because of the State's recognition of individual interests in privacy).
78.  See, e.g.,  Smith v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co.,  370 So.  2d 283 (Ala. 1979)  (upholding
discharge of employee for refusing to take a polygraph test).
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statutory  schemes  have  been  enacted  which  significantly  limit
employer-administered  polygraphs. 79  The  Puerto  Rico  court's
reliance  on  its  constitutional  provisions  to  protect  the  right
against  self-disclosure  has  some  resonance  with  a  line  of
German  cases  protecting  a  right  to  control  information  about
one's self derived  from the human dignity clause.80  Also notable
is  its  ready  willingness  to  assert  the  application  of  the
constitutional  norm  of human  dignity  to  the  actions  of private
parties, a  step the Montana  court has been criticized  for failing
to take in the face of seemingly explicit language.81
Puerto  Rican  decisions  in  other  areas  as  well  invoke  the
human  dignity  and  privacy  clauses  as  a  basis  for  distinctive
constitutional  interpretation.  For  example,  the  Puerto  Rican
court has asserted that the Puerto Rican constitutional provision
against  illegal  searches  and  seizures,  article  II,  section  10,
should be  more  broadly  construed  to prevent  searches  than  its
counterpart  in  the  U.S.  Constitution,  in  part  because  of  the
foundational  commitments  to human dignity.8 2  A minor's right
to  determine  his  paternity  was  held  to  be  protected  by  the
79.  In  some  cases,  state  courts  were  dealing  with  equal  protection  attacks  on
exclusions  from statutory bars on polygraphs,  and did not have  to face what might  seem
more centrally  related to the idea  of human  dignity-whether  the use  of the  polygraph
itself  was  unconstitutional.  In  addition  to  the  Oberg  decision  in  Montana,  see,  for
example,  Long Beach City  Employees Ass'n v.  City of Long Beach, 719  P.2d  660  (Cal.
1986), upholding  a constitutional challenge,  based on equal  protection,  to the  exception,
for public  employees from the general ban on the use of polygraph  testing by employers.
For  the  federal  statute,  see  Employee  Polygraph  Protection  Act  of  1988,  29  U.S.C.  §§
2001-2009  (2000).
80.  See KOMMERS,  supra note 11,  at 299-301,  323-27.
81.  See supra notes  75,  45.  Robbin, supra note  22,  at 553,  556,  draws  attention  as
well  to another  area of contrasting  decisions,  the application  of constitutional  norms  to
private inheritance  disputes.  Compare In  re Will  of Cram,  186  Mont. 37,  606 P.2d  145
(1980)  (rejecting  federal  constitutional  challenge  to  testamentary  trust  instructions
excluding female 4-H  members from receipt  of benefits  under provisions  of will because
of absence  of "state action"  and  not  referring at  all  to state  constitutional provisions),
with  Gonzalez  de  Salas  v.  Super.  Ct.  of  Puerto  Rico,  97  P.R.  Dec.  788,  791  (1969)
(refusing to enforce  custom  denying female  heirs the knowledge  of a  secret  formula  for
the  production  of rum  as  inconsistent  with the  Puerto  Rico  constitution;  "The  family
tradition may be kept  among the heirs and interested parties,  but they cannot have the
benefit  of  the  court  to  make  good,  against  the  laws  and  the  Constitution  [of  the
Commonwealth],  a  discrimination.").  Neither  of these  cases  refer  to  the  respective
human dignity clauses  of their constitutions,  but each  decision illustrates something  of
the  divergent  approaches  these  courts  have  taken  where  the  concerns  of  the  human
dignity clause might be thought in play.
82.  People  v. Lebr6n,  108 P.R. Dec.  324, 340 (1979);  People v. Gonzalez,  20 P.R. Offic.
Trans.  487,  493  (1988);  People  v.  Berrios,  142  P.R.  Dec.  386,  397-98  (1997)  (affirming
that  human  dignity  and  privacy  clauses  give  the  Puerto  Rican  prohibition  on
unreasonable searches and seizures  more breadth than the federal one).
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inviolable dignity clause,8 3 and the clause has been invoked in a
variety  of  settings  involving  causes  of  action  for  wrongful
discharge  and tortious  invasions of  privacy  and  dignity-related
interests.
8 4
The  human  dignity  clause  in  Puerto  Rico,  then, has  been
drawn more actively into dialogue with other parts of the Puerto
Rican constitution, perhaps not surprisingly, since the expressed
motivation  of  the  drafters  was  to  bring  together  different
constitutional  cultures.  Resonances  with transnational  human
rights  instruments  and  European  constitutionalism  (including
that  of  Germany)  are  apparent  not  only  in  the  constitution's
textual provision on human dignity and prohibition of the death
penalty,  but  in  the  question  of  compelled  polygraphy,  and
perhaps  others.8 5  In  this  sense,  the  "expressive"  aspects  of
Puerto  Rico's  original  decision  to  incorporate  a  more
multicultural  and  transnational  constitutionalism  has  been
reflected  in  the  subsequent  constitutional  decisions  of  the
Commonwealth's  highest court.86
Although  Montana's  adoption  of the human  dignity clause
was  less  explicitly  associated  with  the  purpose  of  bringing
together  different  legal traditions  than  was  the  case  in Puerto
Rico,  several very recent  decisions in Montana  (often written by
Justice  Nelson)  suggest  some  greater  degree  of  movement
towards  a  more  distinctive  state  constitutional  jurisprudence.
Very recently the Montana  Supreme  Court relied on the human
dignity  clause  and  principles  of gender  equality  to  inform  its
decision in an engagement ring return case between two private
persons,  and  to  find  and  enforce  enhanced  standards  of
treatment  of prisoners.  It has  insisted,  relying on  the  human
dignity clause,  on the independence in meaning of the Montana
83.  Lopez v.  Santos, 109 P.R. Dec.  563,  754 (1980).  The German constitutional  Court
has  invoked  the  German  "personality" clause,  closely  related  to  its  "human dignity"
clause, to strike down time limitations  (two years after majority) on the ability of a child
to  contest  his  or her  legitimacy.  See  KOMMERS,  supra note  11,  at 312-14  (discussing
Child Legitimacy Case of 1994).
84.  See, e.g.,  Negron v. Caleb  Brett U.S.A.,  Inc.,  212 F.3d  666, 669-70  (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding  violation  of rights  of dignity  and  privacy  under  Puerto  Rico  constitution  in
wrongful  discharge  of  employee  for  refusing  to  change  lab  results);  Dopp  v.  Fairfax
Consultants,  Ltd.,  771  F.  Supp.  494,  496 (D.P.R.  1990)  (noting breadth  of Puerto  Rico
constitution's  dignity clause  in deciding, in diversity  case, whether  claim  for invasion  of
privacy was dismissable).
85.  See supra text accompanying note 76.
86.  See generally Mark Tushnet,  The Possibilities  of Comparative Constitutional  Law,
108  YALE  L.J.  1225,  1269-85  (1999)  (discussing "expressive"  functions  of comparative
constitutionalism).
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Constitution  from  the  federal  Constitution.87  So  if the  human
dignity clause in Montana has largely been confined to playing a
supportive  role  in  elaboration  of  long  standing  paradigms  of
individual rights,  it  may  well  be that a  newer jurisprudence  is
now  evolving  in  which  the human  dignity  clause  helps  justify
the construction of different paradigms.
A further point to consider about the different sources of law
that are subject to interpretation  in the state courts  is that the
state courts generally have authority to elaborate  on and change
state  common law, as well as to interpret the state constitution
and statutes.  For example, state courts  sometimes look to state
constitutional  provisions-even  those  limited  to  government
action-to  determine  the  "public  policy"  to  be  applied  in
litigation  between  private  litigants.88  The  "engagement  ring"
decision  might be  taken  as  an example  of this development  in
Montana.  In New York,  Chief Judge Judith Kaye has noted the
ability of state courts to "move  seamlessly  between the common
law  and  state  constitutional  law,"  and  has  also  identified
benefits from state court creativity based clearly on common law
rather  than  constitutional  grounds,  because  common  law
decisions  are  more readily  subject  to modification by courts  and
by  legislatures.8 9   Such  an  attitude  of  invited  partnership
87.  Cf. Dorwart  v.  Caraway,  2002  MT  240,  79-114,  312  Mont.  1,  79-114,  58
P.3d  128,  79-114 (Nelson, J.,  specially concurring) (noting that Montana  Constitution
should  not  be  interpreted  like  federal  because  it  includes  many  provisions,  including
dignity  clause,  that federal  Constitution  does not  have,  all  in  support  of  finding  state
constitutional privacy clause gives rise to implied private right of action for damages).
88.  Compare Hennessey  v.  Coastal  Eagle  Point  Oil  Co.,  609  A.2d  11  (N.J.  1992)
(concluding  that private  employer  discharge  of employee  who  failed  random drug  test
was  inconsistent  with  public  policy  and  thus  actionable  as  wrongful  discharge  and
treating the state constitution as well as state common law and legislation as sources  for
public policy),  with Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d  1123 (Alaska 1989)
(concluding that although  the state constitution's  protection of privacy did not  apply to
private employers the provision could be considered by the court in determining whether
public policy was offended by an employer's discharge  of an employee but concluding that
given  public  policy interests  in  safety  the  employer's  drug  testing  did not  contravene
public  policy) (I am  grateful to  ROBERT  F. WILLIAMS,  STATE  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  236
(3d  ed.  1999),  for  helpful  attention  to  the  phenomenon  of  state  courts'  use  of  state
constitutions to determine  public  policy.).  To the extent that state courts  develop  state
common law based on the  "policy" in state constitutional  provisions,  the distinctions in
federal "state  action" doctrine  between  the application  of common  law  rules  in private
litigation, on the  one hand,  and  application  of state statutory  or constitutional  law,  on
the other, may become ever more difficult to sustain.
89.  Judith  S.  Kaye,  Brennan Lecture: State Courts at the  Dawn of a  New  Century:
Common  Law  Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  1,  15-17
(1995).  Kaye's attitude of partnership with the legislature in the elaboration  of rights is
in marked  contrast  to the  U.S. Supreme  Court's assertion  of hierarchic  dominion  over
Vol. 65
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between  state  courts  and legislatures  in defining  rights stands
in significant contrast to recent decisions on issues of federal law
by  the U.S.  Supreme  Court.9 0  It  may  reflect  the  state  courts'
deeper  engagement  with  development  of  the  common  law,  in
which  legislative intervention  is  now  a norm.  It  may reflect as
well  state  courts'  greater  comfort  levels  with  the  general
comparative  exercise;  that is, of looking to other related sources
of law  and  other articulators  of law-in the federal  courts  and
the  other  state  courts-for  assistance  in  reaching  their  own
decisions.  It  is possible  that  these habits of mind  in the state
judiciary  will  also  make  it  possible  for  state  courts,  like  the
Supreme Court of Puerto  Rico in the private polygraph case  and
others,  to  begin  to  learn  from  comparative  constitutional  law
and  human  rights  law  from  courts  around  the  world,  to  the
extent they grapple with similar issues.91
III.  CLOSING  THOUGHTS
It is important to note the degree of transnational  influence
within  U.S.  constitutionalism,  broadly  understood  as  including
decisions in state, territorial  or commonwealth  courts.  It would
be  a  mistake  to think  that national  level  governments  are  the
only diffusers of transnational constitutionalism.  Even if largely
unnoticed  in  federal  constitutional  discourse,  our  subnational
units  have  been learning,  not  only  from other states  and  from
federal  decisions,  but  also  from  the  transnational  and
international constitutional  discourse  of human rights.92  But it
the interpretation of federal rights.
90.  In  federal  constitutional  interpretation,  the  U.S.  Court  has  manifested  some
resistance  to  having its  own  constitutional  interpretations  informed  by  congressional
views.  See, e.g.,  City of Boerne  v.  Flores, 521 U.S.  507,  535-36  (1997);  see also Vicki  C.
Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574  ANNALS  AM.  ACAD.
POL.  &  SOC.  SC.  145,  153-55  (2001);  Robert  C.  Post  &  Reva  B.  Siegel,  Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric  Interpretation  of the Family and
Medical Leave Act,  112 YALE L.J. 1943,  1945-46 (2003).  On statutory issues, by contrast,
the Court  has  recently  been  reluctant  to engage  in purposive  interpretation  of federal
remedial  statutes,  on grounds  of  at least purported  deference  to  Congress.  For critical
discussion, see Daniel J.  Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial  Passivity,  2002  SUP. CT.
REV.  343.
91.  Cf. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 13, at 634-38 (linking U.S. Court's
skepticism  towards  congressional  involvement  in constitutional  interpretation  with  its
resistance  to  comparative  constitutional  learning).  On  state  court  receptivity  to
international or foreign sources  of law on human rights, see infra note 92.
92.  Indeed, an increasing  number of state  courts  have referred  to such international
or  foreign sources of law on human rights.  See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp,  625 P.2d  123,  131
n.21  (Or.  1981)  (Linde,  J.)  (interpreting  state constitutional  rule  protecting  prisoners
against  "unnecessary  rigor"  of  confinement  and  referring  to  Universal  Declaration  of
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is  important  also  to  note  the  relatively  small  inroads  on
discourse  in  Montana  that the  human  dignity  clause  has  had
thus far, perhaps showing  the influence  of a dominant  model of
constitutional  discourse  derived  from  the  U.S.  Constitution,
though one perhaps itself in the process  of change.9 3  Given the
appai'ently  robust  tradition in Puerto  Rico and the possibilities
for  development  in Montana,  students  of transnational  human
rights  discourse  would do  well in  the future  to pay attention  to
the multiple fora for the development, diffusion, and articulation
of foundational  concepts  of human dignity, looking  not  only to
international,  transnational  and  national  sources  but  also  to
subnational  entities  that  function  with  sufficient  independence
to develop their own lines of authority and reasoning. 94
Human  Rights,  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  European
Convention on Human Rights as illuminating aspects  of human dignity involved in such
protection);  Boehm  v.  Super.  Ct.,  178  Cal.  App.  3d  494,  502  (1986)  (analyzing state
statute concerning general assistance payments, quoting from Universal Declaration and
enjoining certain  administrative  cutbacks  in  benefits);  Moore  v.  Ganim,  660 A.2d  742,
771,  780-82  (Conn.  1995)  (Peters, J.,  concurring) (discussing the  Universal  Declaration
and the International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and Cultural Rights in  concluding
that,  while  state  constitution  should  be  construed  to  include  right  to  minimal
subsistence,  the  challenged  statute  was  consistent  with historic  limitations  on  public
support);  State  v.  Wilder,  2000  ME  32,  20,  748  A.2d  444,  20  (reversing father's
conviction  for  assaulting  son;  discussing  British  common  law  approach;  contrasting
European  Court  of Human Rights  approach;  concluding  that under Maine  law parents
had right to administer  moderate or reasonable punishment, even though nine countries
in  Europe ban corporeal punishment  of children);  Jones v. Florida,  740  So.  2d  520,  524-
25  (Fla.  1999)  (reversing  conviction  for  failure  to  hold  timely  competency  hearing  in
violation  of Due  Process  Clause  and  Florida rule  of criminal procedure  and  relying in
part  on Justice  Breyer's  opinions  invoking  foreign  decisions  on  delay in  carrying  out
death  penalty,  including  the  decision  in  Soering v.  United Kingdom in  the  European
Court  of  Human  Rights,  161  Eur.  Ct.  H.R.  (ser.  A)  (1989),  available  at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc).
93.  In Lawrence v.  Texas,  123 S.  Ct. 2472 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court overturned
its  own earlier  decision and held  unconstitutional  a  state law criminalizing consensual
adult  sodomy.  The  Montana  court  had  reached  this  conclusion  under  its  own
constitution in  1997.  The U.S.  Court relied, in part, on European  decisions, concluding
that: ' The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of
human  freedom  in  many  other  countries.  There  has  been  no  showing  that  in  this
country the  governmental  interest  in circumscribing  personal choice  is  somehow  more
legitimate  or  urgent."  Id.  at  2481-83.  The  Court  also  noted  state  court  decisions,
including  that  of the  Montana  court  in  Gryzcan, abolishing  prohibitions  on  same  sex
sodomy.  Id.  at 2480.  The U.S. Court's greater openness to comparative  legal approaches
to human rights  may invite further exploration  of these  approaches  by the state courts
on state law issues.
94.  See, e.g.,  Linde, supra note 20, at 416 (urging state court attention to foreign and
international law in  interpreting state criminal procedure; "If a state court is persuaded
that the state's people  deserve  no less liberty, fairness  or humane treatment under  its
Bill of Rights  than  are received  by citizens  of other countries,  it can  so  decide without
concern about federal holdings or doctrines.").
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